Antiantisocial Networks

Today TechCrunch reported on a paper describing a way to use Facebook for malicious means.  The paper describes a DDoS attack that can be done, leveraging the large number of users of an application to attack a victim site.

While this attack vector is legitimate, I see a number of things that make it inherently infeasibly, and don’t think it really warrants being called a “FaceBot” (implying similar power to a botnet).

In order to create an application, one obviously needs to create a Facebook account, though that can be done anonymously.  The real issue is that in order to execute such an attack, one would need to make an application that is incredibly popular.  The attacker would need to devote a large number of resources to keeping such a popular app up, which would all need to be done anonymously (though would need to be paid for in one way or another).

Let’s say an attacker has gone through all of this to make a popular application: why doesn’t he/she just use those resources for a direct attack?  One possibly answer is that the Facebook DDoS would be hard to shut down, or better in some other way in executing the attack.  This is false because as soon as someone realizes that their traffic is coming from Facebook (whether by referrers, or FB trying to pull images for its cache, or some other mechanism), it can in most instances be stopped immediately, especially considering how most Facebook calls to other sites include the application’s API keys.  Even barring that, IP addresses and Facebook’s logging can be used to determine what application a user was in when they requested the victim’s site.

Additionally, DDoSs using this attack vector are relatively easy to mitigate.  If a hacker already has all of these resources dedicated to keeping an application up, why wouldn’t they just launch a TCP SYN flood or similar lower-level attack, much more potent DoSs, even if launched from a more limited IP range.

Let’s take a different route: suppose a hacker attacks one of Slide’s applications and somehow manages to break in and add an attack iframe.  This is a completely legitimate and anonymous way of attacking a site (though it begs the question of why the hacker didn’t just break into the target site in the first place, assuming both have similar levels of security).  While this is a legitimate issue, the same holds true for all websites.  Should someone hack into Yahoo! and figure out how to deploy a new home page (somewhere between almost-impossible and no-freaking-way on the difficulty scale), almost any site on the internet could easily be taken down.  I certainly hope top app developers take security as seriously as top website owners, but this is nothing special for Facebook.

On the topic of information theft, this is why Facebook requires you to explicitly permit an application to access your information.  The concept of an API implies this potential for theft…users are trusting applications to access their information and not keep it.  There is no way to prevent this for the same reason DRM doesn’t work: if people can view things they can store things.  While this is a legitimate concern, again it is nothing new, and not much can be done about it short of user education.